Banks and Banking--Duty to Third Parties--Holder in Due Course [\u3ci\u3eMaley v. East Side Bank\u3c/i\u3e, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966)] by Morris, Sarah D.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2
1967
Banks and Banking--Duty to Third Parties--Holder
in Due Course [Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d
393 (7th Cir. 1966)]
Sarah D. Morris
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sarah D. Morris, Banks and Banking--Duty to Third Parties--Holder in Due Course [Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.
1966)], 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 687 (1967)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol18/iss2/16
DUTY OF BANKS
BANKS AND BANKING - DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES -
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966).
A depository bank has traditionally been held to a high standard
of care in its dealings with depositors, both as a fiduciary and as
an agent.' It has also been uniformly decided that this duty of
care, being contractual in nature, extends only to the contracting
party, the depositor,2 so that recovery for a breach of this duty by
the bank is available only to him.' The Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) affirms the liability of a payor bank to its customer for dam-
ages arising out of the "wrongful dishonor of an item."4  However,
the question of a bank's liability to third parties for losses incurred
by the fraudulent acts of a corporate depositor where the bank might
have prevented the fraud has not, until recently, been seriously con-
sidered.5
In Maley v. East Side Bank,' the trustee in bankruptcy of a
corporation sued the defendant bank on behalf of its creditors to
recover the cost of building materials which the corporation had
purchased with funds supplied 6y the creditors. The corporation's
previous owners had contracted to sell the entire business to an
individual who, for the month preceding completion of the contract
of sale, was named president of the corporation, the previous owners
being allowed to remain as secretary and treasurer. A resolution
was filed with the defendant bank stating that during this period
the president could cash only those corporate checks which bore the
indorsement of the treasurer. When the contract of sale was com-
pleted approximately one month later, the previous owners with-
drew from the corporation and the president became sole owner
of the company. No new deposit resolution was filed with the bank
at that time, nor was the old resolution requiring the treasurer's
indorsement formally withdrawn. However, the new owner gave
1 See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 114 P.2d 661 (Cal.
Dist Ct. App. 1941), affd, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); 9 CJ.S. Banks &
Banking § 1007 (1938).
2 Id. § 290.
3 Ibid.
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402 [hereinafter cited as UCCJ.
5 Cf. Field v. Lew, 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nom., Field v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., 296 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962).
6 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966).
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the bank a signature card, containing only his signature, as authori-
zation for his future transactions as head of the corporation.
7
During the several weeks preceding completion of the sale, the
bank was inundated with inquiries concerning the credit of the
president and the corporation. On the basis of the favorable infor-
mation supplied by the bank, large amounts of building materials
were sold to the president on credit, and he resold these materials
to other concerns in return for checks made payable to the corpora-
tion. During the month following completion of the sale of the
corporation, the defendant bank cashed and credited to the presi-
dent's personal account $46,000 worth of these checks. None of
the proceeds were ever credited to the corporate account, nor were
the creditors ever paid. The corporation thereafter was adjudicated
bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy brought an action against
the defendant bank to recover the amount due the defrauded credi-
tors.
8
The court in Maley found the bank liable to the creditors on
several grounds. The first of these was that the bank was negligent
in cashing and crediting the checks to the president personally, this
act being a direct violation of the resolution on file with the bank.9
The court emphasized the bank's lack of due care in the transactions;
however, there was no discussion regarding the party to whom theinitial duty was owed."° Thus it would be helpful to examine the
question of what duty is owed by banks to their depositors.
The courts have always treated deposit agreements as being for
the benefit of the depositor rather than third parties." Thus, the
duty of care owing and hence the possible liability is to the deposi-
tor. Because the terms of a deposit agreement are binding upon a
bank, it cannot legally pay out funds except upon the approval and
signature required by the agreement, 2 and to do otherwise might
result in liability to the depositor for conversion."
7Id. at 395-98.
8Id. at 397-98.
9 Id. at 400-01.
10 Id. at 395-402.
11 Cf. Field v. Lew, 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nom., Field v. Bank-
ers Trust Co., 296 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); UCC
§ 4-402; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 494 (1963).
12 See National City Bank v. Harbin Elec. Joint-Stock Co., 28 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.
1928); Speasl v. National Bank, 37 Ill. App. 2d 384, 186 N.E.2d 84 (1962); Miller
v. First Granite City Nat'l Bank, 349 Ill. App. 347, 110 N.E.2d 651 (1953); 10 AM.
JUR. 2D Banks § 493, at 462 (1963).
13 Accord, Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat'l Bank, 228 N.Y. 37, 126 NX.
347 (1920).
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Since the initial contractual and fiduciary duty of care is owed
to the depositor, one who has a claim against the bank must place
himself in the position of a depositor, in other words, in privity with
the bank. For example, in Hoffman v. First Nat'l Bank,14 one joint
depositor forged the required signature of the other. The bank
honored the check. The court said that the aggrieved joint deposi-
tor, in order to recover from the bank for breach of its contractual
duty, must first prove an interest in the bank account upon which
to base the action.' "
The duty has been found owing, however, to the assignee in
interest of a partnership"8 on the ground that the bank, in violating
an existing partnerghip resolution by cashing partnership checks for
the personal use of one member, was an active participant in the
fraud perpetrated on the partnership. The assignee in interest was
found to stand in the shoes of the partnership and therefore was
the party to whom the duty was owing. The duty was based on
a contractual relationship, which is in turn a prerequisite for a find-
ing of negligence.
One case, Seaman v. Muir,"8 considered the issue in Maley, that
is, the nature of a bank's liability to the creditors of its depositors.
In Seaman, a company sold all its assets in order to pay its creditors.
The money from the sale was deposited in the defendant bank, and
the creditors then sued the bank for the money owing them. In
holding that the creditors had no tide to or interest in the bank's
debt to the company, except by attachment or execution,' 9 the court
failed to consider the question of negligence. However, it was indi-
cated that the relationship between the bank and the depositor was
merely that of debtor-creditor and that thus the bank had no affirm-
ative responsibility either to pay its depositor's debts to third party
creditors or to close the transaction. Inasmuch as the bank owed
no duty to the non-contracting third party creditors, they could claim
no injury due to the bank's negligence.2"
14 299 Il. App. 290, 20 N.E.2d 121 (1939).
15 Id. at 296, 20 N.E.2d at 124.
'6 Mclntosh v. Detroit Say. Bank, 247 Mich. 10, 225 N.W. 628 (1929).
17 Ibid. (by implication).
18 72 Ore. 583, 144 Pac. 121 (1914).
1 Id. at 590, 144 Pac. at 123.
2o Ibld. Furthermore, the duty of a bank has not only been traditionally limited to
the depositor but also that depositor must prove that there has been a violation of a
deposit agreement. Only then does the burden shift to the bank to prove that it exer-
cised due care in fulfilling the terms of the agreement. Duncan v. National Bank,
285 Ill. App. 305, 1 N.E.2d 902 (1936).
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With this background in mind, it should be noted that the
court in Maley v. East Side Bank2 reasoned that because no new
deposit resolution had been submitted to the bank when the corpora-
tion changed hands, the old resolution continued to be binding.
22
The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the president
had become the sole officer and stockholder, which would indicate
that the treasurer's indorsement would no longer be required. Nev-
ertheless, by force of logic, once the court found that the resolution
was still binding, it became necessary to hold the bank liable for
negligently breaching the resolution. But even if some duty were
owing by the bank to the third party creditors, it seems unreasonable
to presume that the bank and the sole owner intended that the
treasurer's indorsement would still be required after the treasurer
had left the corporation."
In general, a bank pays checks in accordance with the signature
card filed by the depositor.24 Although an unsigned memo is an
insufficient contract," in Maley the bank had both the signature
card signed by the president and the knowledge that he had acquired
sole ownership of the corporate account. These two factors should
have convinced the court that the parties did not intend to be bound
by the old resolution, especially because it has been held that a
bank can rely on a corporate president's presumed authority to cash
corporate checks, absent notice or knowlege that he lacks such au-
thority.26 In Maley this authority was not merely presumed - it
was a known fact. Even more compelling is the fact that payment
to a sole stockholder has been deemed payment to the corporation
itself."7
21361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1966).
22 Id. at 401.
2 Note that all the checks were cashed or credited to the president's personal ac-
count after ownership of the corporation had passed entirely to him. Id. at 398. It is
interesting to note that the original purpose of the resolution in Maley requiring the
treasurer's indorsement of all checks cashed by the president was for security purposes,
to insure that the president would pay the balance of the contract price to the outgoing
officers. Brief for Appellant, p. 46, Maley v. East Side Bank, 361 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.
1966); See 361 F.2d at 396.
24 10 AM. JuR. 2D Banks § 540, at 515 (1963).
25 Cf. Thornton v. Athens Nat'l Bank, 252 S.W. 278 (Tex. Cir. Ct. App. 1923).
26 Krantz v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 16 Ill. App. 2d 331, 335, 147 N.E.2d
881, 883 (1958). Cf. Renault v. L. N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 188 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.
1951), wherein the court recognized the authority of a depositor to waive the restrictive
character of a special indorsement by collecting as though the instrument had been
generally indorsed.
27 See Lapp v. Loufek, 113 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1953); 19 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 1004, at 471-72 (1940), wherein it is stated that the trend is to uphold as binding
the acts of a person who owns all or most of the stock in a corporation, even though
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In light of the preceding discussion, it can be seen that the bank
in Maley, according to traditional authority, neither breached a con-
tractual duty to its corporate depositor nor owed a duty of care to
the creditors upon which liability for negligence could be based.
The court in Maley, however, did not rest its finding of liability
solely upon breach of a contractual duty (if any truly existed as to
the creditors), but rather it found a second ground for recovery in
the Uniform Commercial Code. The court reasoned that due
to the bank's knowing violation of the deposit agreement, it
lost its holder-in-due-course status and was therefore subject to the
claims of the corporation and its creditors.28 The UCC provides
that "unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to all valid claims to it on the part of
any person. 29
A definition of holder-in-due-course status could be determina-
tive of the bank's liability for negligence. The UCC defines a
holder in due course as one who takes the negotiable instrument
for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defense or claim
to it on the part of any person2 ° Good faith is defined as "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 1  One has the
requisite notice of a fact when he has actual knowlege, has received
notice or notification of it, or from all the facts and circumstances
known to him at the time in question, has reason to know that it
exists.'
2
The court in Maley found that the circumstances surrounding
negotiation of the checks placed the defendant bank on notice and
revealed its lack of good faith, thereby defeating its status as holder
in due course. Accordingly, the bank was subject to the claims of
the creditors despite the lack of a contractual relationship with
them."3 The court indicated that the bank's liability arose from
the negotiation of the checks in knowing violation of the old deposit
agreement. This interpretation implies that the creditors had a
prior valid claim on the instruments at the time they were negotiated
there has been a technical defect in the action (e.g., the violation of an old deposit agree-
ment). But see id. § 1044.
28 361 F.2d at 401.
2 9 UCC § 3-306(a), as adopted in Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-306(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1963).
30 UCC § 3-302.
31 UCC § 1-201 (19).
32 UCC § 1-205 (25).
33 361 F.2d at 401.
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and further implies that the bank violated a duty to them when it
credited the checks, payable to the corporation, to the president's
personal account. Such reasoning seems untenable, for although the
creditors did have an interest in the corporation insofar as there
was a debt owing them for the materials obtained on credit, they
had no legal interest in, or right to, the checks payable to the cor-
poration.
The court's approach conflicts with the idea that a bank, from
the moment it negotiates an instrument, is in a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship with its depositor. 4 The discrepancy arises because holder-
in-due-course questions occur only when the action is on the instru-
ment itself. The holder in due course must take for value, that is,
for fair consideration.35 It is the lack of value in the exchange
which distinguishes the debtor-creditor relationship from the in-
stances in which holder-in-due-course status arises.
This distinction is well illustrated by Field v. Lew," a case quite
similar to Maley, wherein a depositor's trustee in bankruptcy sued
various banks for their alleged participation in fraudulent transfers of
corporate funds to the corporate president for his personal use. The
court held that because insolvency occurred when the instruments
were fraudulently transferred, creditors had an action against trans-
ferees of the instruments who had not given fair consideration. How-
ever, since no corporate property was transferred to the banks,
they were not transferees but rather agents of the corporation, and
as such they might be liable to the corporation for breach of a
fiduciary duty if they had knowledge of the fraudulent intentions
of the president. In any event, they did not fall into the category
of holders in due course, for there was no fair consideration ex-
changed upon the negotiation of the instruments."
The same reasoning, if applied to the facts in Maley, would
achieve an identical result, which demonstrates that the question of
holder-in-due-course status was erroneously decided. However, the
court did adopt holder-in-due-course reasoning and in fact broad-
ened the possible instances of liability of a non-holder in due course.
As a third ground for recovery the court asserted that regardless
of a showing that the bank lost its status by negotiating the instru-
ments in violation of the deposit resolution, the bank also forfeited
34 See Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948).
35UCC §§ 3-302(1) (a), 3-303(a).
36 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nom., Field v. Bankers Trust Co.,
296 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962).
37 Id. at 28-29.
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this status due to its negligence in the transactions whereby the
creditors were defrauded. 8 The lack of good faith was so flagrant
and the notice so obvious from the circumstances that holder-in-due-
course status was never achieved, thus making the bank liable to
the creditors' claims.89
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law4" employed an ob-
jective test of what constituted sufficient bad faith to destroy holder-
in-due-course status;41 negligence alone was never determinative of
bad faith.4" Constructive notice was determined objectively and
extended only to that which a reasonable inquiry might reveal. As
to a bank, there was ordinarily no duty of active inquiry."
As we have seen, the UCC expands the area in which construc-
tive notice is sufficient to destroy the potential holder-in-due-course
status.44 The objective test has been superseded by a subjective test
(applied by the court in Maley), for there can be no good faith on
the part of the taker if he had constructive notice of any infirmi-
ties.48 This subjective standard would seem to indicate shifting
standards of good faith depending upon particular business standards,
as well as particular facts and circumstances.4
To require a prudent taker to question virtually every aspect of
a possibly defective instrument does not seem unreasonable, espe-
cially where the taker is a bank - a fiduciary with great responsi-
bility and knowledge. However, the court in Maley seems to have
done away with the distinction between the degrees of negligence
necessary to create liability as a non-holder in due course. The
court implies that the slight degree of negligence involved in the
failure to respond to constructive notice of a suspicious circumstance
creates the same liability as the gross negligence involved in a know-
ing breach of a contractual agreement. The court would say that
in either case the bank lost holder-in-due-course status and is no
38 361 F.2d at 401-02.
39 ibid.
4 0 UNIFOR NEGOTIABLE INSTRumENTS LAw § 52(1), 56.
4 1 See Britton, Holder in Due Coarse - A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law With Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417 (1954).
42 See Moore v. Potomac Say. Bank, 160 Va. 597, 169 S.E. 922 (1933).
43 See Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U.S. 473 (1927); Continental Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Stirling, 65 Idaho 123, 140 P.2d 230 (1943). See also 11 AM. JuR.
2D Bills & Notes § 432 (1963).
44UCC §§ 1-201(5), 3-304.
45 That is, he has constructive notice, if, due to facts and circumstances, he should
have known at the time that infirmities existed.
4 6 Britton, supra note 41, at 429-30.
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less liable to the creditors than it would be had it violated a con-
tractual duty to them.
The Maley decision may have far-reaching consequences. Al-
though the contractual liability of a bank has traditionally been
limited to the depositor, and has not been extended beyond those
debts or liabilities incurred or contracted in the ordinary course of
conducting a banking business, 7 the decision in Maley indicates
that the definition of what constitutes the ordinary course of con-
ducting a banking business may be extended far beyond the tradi-
tional limits. The result reached here would, in fact, make a de-
pository bank a virtual auditor for all corporate banking transac-
tions. The bank would be required to ascertain not only that all
corporate checks are credited to the corporate account but also that
no corporate check is paid out on a fraudulent basis. It would
make the bank an auditor for all corporate disbursements and thus
liable to the charge of constructive notice if it failed to detect pos-
sible fraudulent activities of its corporate depositor. Hence, the
bank would be liable to any third parties should the fraud succeed.
This decision alters yet another traditional privilege of a bank.
As a fiduciary, "A national bank has no power to engage in the
business of furnishing to depositors or to others gratuitously or for
compensation, direct or indirect, information as to the solvency, or
condition or reputation, financial or otherwise, of persons, firms, or
corporations."4 This precept of inviolate secrecy is fundamental to
the bank-depositor relationship." However, because commercial
practice does recognize that a bank is often called on to give credit
ratings to businessmen, it might well be asked: what of contribu-
tory negligence? Are the creditors in Maley held to no duty of
checking potential business dealings beyond seeking a credit rating
from a bank? Of the forty-one creditors allowed to recover from
the bank in Maley, only eleven had actually contacted the bank."
Would not this new commercial responsibility to the business com-
munity destroy the bank's traditional fiduciary relationship with its
depositor? It would surely give the bank the additional responsi-
bility not only of auditing all corporate accounts but also of serving
in a "Dun and Bradstreet" capacity.
Even if this increased responsibility were demanded by the UCC,
47 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking 5 79, at 153 (1938).
48 People's Nat'l Bank v. Southern States Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 77, 133 S.E. 415,
419 (1926).
49 See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
50 Brief for Appellant, supra note 23, at 55.
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